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NOTES

THE IMPACT OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ON
THE FORMAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE FLORIDA
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW
The Florida Legislature has adopted a resolution establishing a
committee to study the feasibility of adopting the Uniform Commercial Code.1 On October 7, 1964, the Legislative Council committee, a committee from the Florida Bankers' Association, and a
committee from the Florida Bar met jointly to consider a report compiled by the two latter committees. Upon completion of a draft of
this report, the Legislative Council committee will make a recommendation to the Legislative Council whether the Uniform Commer2
cial Code should be presented to the 1965 session of the legislature.
In light of these developments, it is believed a comparison of the
Code provisions with existing Florida negotiable instruments law concerning the formal requisites of negotiability is appropriate.
Under both the Code and the N.I.L. the formal requisites of
negotiability may be classified under the following broad headings:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

writing and signature;
nature of the promise or order to pay;
time of payment;
payment of a sum certain in money;
designation of parties;
permissible clauses.

This note will compare the provisions of the Code corresponding with
the N.I.L. in these broad areas and will include comment on the
changes generally, and any direct effect on Florida case law in particular.
At the outset, a comparison must be drawn between the Code and
the N.I.L. with regard to the approach taken to the law of negotiability. The N.I.L.'s approach is that an instrument to be negotiable
must conform to the formal requirements of the N.I.L. 3 The Code,
however, provides that an instrument must meet its formal requisites
to be negotiable "within this article." 4 The purpose of the language
employed by the Code is to leave open the possibility that some
writings may be made negotiable by other statutes or by judicial
decision,5 while the N.I.L. seemingly forecloses characterization of any
1. S. Con. Res. 692 (1963).
2. Letter From Senator John M. McCarty, Chairman of the legislative committee, to author, Oct. 14, 1964.
3. UNIFORM NEOTIABLE INSrRUMENTs LAW §1; FLA. STAT. §674.02 (1963).
4. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §3-104. [hereinafter cited as CODE]
5. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (U.L.A.) §3-104, comment 1.
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instrument as a negotiable chose in action unless it conforms to N.I.L.
requirements. The position taken by the Code favors a policy of
flexibility toward local law and innovations in commercial practice,
while the prime consideration under the N.I.L. is certainty and uniformity of judicial decision. The Code's position has been criticized
by Professor Britton as clashing with the advancement of the cause of
uniformity.6 It should be noted, however, that the uncompromising
position taken by the N.I.L. has been subject to some legislative
tinkering in order to create or maintain other forms of negotiability
7
that were believed to be locally desirable.
The Code makes one other change that should be kept in mind
before delving into the formal requirements. While the N.I.L. is
applicable to all negotiable instruments, including bonds, the Code
treats bonds separately in article 6. This article, as such, will not be
considered in this note.
WRITING AND SIGNATURE

N.I.L.
N.I.L. section 1 (1):8 [The instrument] must be in writing
and signed by the maker or drawer ....
Code
Code section 3-104 (1) (a): Any writing to be a negotiable
instrument within this Article must be signed by the maker or
drawer.
The writing and signature requirements of the N.I.L. and Code
involve no change.
NATURE OF THE PROMISE OR ORDER

To

PAY

N.I.L.
9

N.I.L. section 1 (2): [The instrument] must contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money ....
Code
Code section 3-104 (1) (b): [The writing must] contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money
and no other promise, order, obligation, or power given by
the maker or drawer except as authorized by this Article ....
6. Britton, Formal Requisites of Negotiability - The Negotiable Instruments
Law Compared With the Proposed Commercial Code, 26 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 1
(1953-1954).

7.
8.
9.

See GA. CODE §14-201 (2) (1933).
FLA. STAT. §674.02 (1) (1963).
FLA. STAT. §674.02 (2) (1963).
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Although both the Code and the N.I.L. provide that the instrument must contain an unconditional promise or order, the N.I.L.
does not define "unconditional," and the only illustration of a conditional promise given by the N.I.L. is that an order or promise to
pay out of a particular fund is not unconditional. 10 As a result,
some courts have found that the promise could be conditioned by
implied and constructive conditions, while Florida 1 and the majority
of jurisdictions have held that only express conditions destroy negotiability. 12 The Code settles the conflict in favor of the majority
view by expressly providing that implied or constructive conditions
do not make a promise conditional. 3 The Code continues the
provision of the N.I.L. that promises to pay out of a particular fund
are not unconditional, 14 but carves out two important exceptions to
this rule. The first exception provides that payment out of a particular fund does not condition an instrument issued by a government
or governmental agency,' 5 and the second holds that payment limited
to the entire assets of a partnership, unincorporated association, trust,
or estate does not condition a promise made by or on behalf of such
an entity.' 6 These exceptions obviously are based on a policy that the
organizations involved should have the added benefit of flexibility in
their financing arrangements that accrues with the broadened power
to issue negotiable paper in such fashion.
The Code, on other questions that have arisen under the N.I.L.,
embodies the majority position by providing that a promise is unconditional that states it is made in accordance with or "as per" a
transaction, but is conditional if it states it is governed by or "subject to" another agreement."7 The Code also reflects the majority view
that a statement that the instrument is secured by a mortgage or
otherwise does not condition the promise and destroy negotiability.' s
The Code provisions in this area clarify many questions that have
arisen under the N.I.L. and the expansion of the unconditional
promise area represents a desirable change by recognizing paper that
is already acceptable to the commercial community.

10.
11.
(1940).
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

UNIFORm NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW §3; FLA. STAT. §674.04 (1963).
First Bank of Marianna v. Havana Canning Co., 142 Fla. 554, 195 So. 188
See BrrIrON, Bius AND NoTEs §11 (1961).
CODE §3-105 (1) (a).
CODE §3-105 (1) (b).
CODE §3-105 (1) (g).
CODE §3-105 (1) (hi).
CODE § §-105 (1) (b), (2) (a).
CODE §3-105 (1) (e).
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TIME OF PAYMENT

N.I.L.
19

[The instrument] must be payable
N.I.L. section 1 (3):
on demand, or at a fixed or determinable future time ....
Code
Code section 3-104 (1) (c): [The writing must] be payable on
demand or at a definite time ....

The Code's choice of "definite time" over the "determinable
future time" employed by the N.I.L. is magnified when considered
in the light of section 4 (3) of the N.I.L., which provides that the
determinable future time requirement is satisfied when the instrument is payable on or at a fixed period after occurrence of a specified
event that is certain to happen although the time of the happening
may be uncertain. 2" Under this recipe the emphasis is placed on
certainty from the viewpoint of being able to identify maturity in
the future. An instrument that is acceptable under this provision
21
does not meet the definite time requirement of the Code. Thus, in
22
Cunningham v. Weatherford a note made payable one day after the
death of the maker was held to be negotiable under the Florida N.I.L.
Under the Code, however, such an instrument would not be negotiable
since the happening of the measuring event is uncertain as to the
time of occurrence. Thus, a class of paper, which the drafters of the
acceptability, is deprived
Code believed to be limited in commercial
3
negotiability.'
of
benefits
the
of
The courts are in conflict over the effect of an acceleration clause
on the negotiability of an instrument. The majority holds that most
acceleration clauses do not destroy negotiability, with the exception
of those clauses that allow acceleration at the unconditioned option
of the holder. 2" This interpretation prevails even though the N.I.L.
certainty of time requirement is satisfied if the instrument is payable
"on or before a fixed or determinable future time." 25 The Code attempts to settle this conflict by providing that the time requirement
is satisfied when the instrument is payable at a definite time subject
to "any acceleration.' 26 This clause is designed to isolate from negotiability objections all acceleration clauses, whether conditional or
§674.02 (3) (1963).
§674.05 (3) (1963).
CODE §3-109 (2).
159 Fla. 864, 32 So. 2d 913 (1947).
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (U.L.A.) §3-109, comment 1.
See BRITITON, BILLS AND NOTES §28 (1961) and cases cited therein.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

FLA.

25.

UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW

STAT.
FLA. STAT.

§4 (2);

FLA. STAT.

§674.05 (2) (1963).

26. CODE §3-109 (1) (c).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol17/iss3/7

4

1964]

Williams: The Impact ofNOTES
the Uniform Commercial Code on the Formal Requireme

unconditional, at the option of the holder or maker, or automatic.27
Professor Britton believes the basic policy underlying the decisions
holding that acceleration clauses destroy negotiability is the desire
of the courts to protect the obligor from a demand for payment before he expects to pay. 28 Recognizing this policy, the Code softens the
effect of its provision allowing any acceleration by requiring that the
29
holder of such an optional power must exercise it in good faith.
The position taken by the Code does not appear to change Florida
law as evidenced by the cases. Although no case involving a completely unconditional option has been found, the decisions have upheld instruments that contained an acceleration clause exercisable at
the holder's option upon the happening of a specified event,3 0 and
those that contained an automatic acceleration clause.31
The counterpart of the acceleration clause is the extension clause.
Under the N.I.L. the general provisions that define a "determinable
future time" are applied to determine the validity of an extension
clause. The Code deals with these clauses in two sections that must be
read together for a proper interpretation of the provisions.32
Extension clauses may be exercisable at the option of the holder,
the maker, or may be automatic. When an extension clause is utilized,
the primary difficulties are raised where the extension is at the holder's
option, and when the clause outlines the effect that an extension will
have on the liability of sureties and indorsers. When the clause is
at the holder's option, the concern stems from the possibility that
a holder may extend the due date without the maker's consent,
thereby continuing the maker's liability to pay at an interest rate
advantageous to the holder. A literal reading of section 3-109 (d) of
the Code seems to permit this situation to exist, but section 3-118 (f)
of the Code clarifies this by limiting the holder's power of extension
to instances in which he has the consent of the maker "notwithstanding any term of the instrument." A clause dealing with the latter
example concerning the liability of secondary parties in the case of an
extension is not really an extension clause at all, but merely a permissible clause amounting to an agreement by secondary parties to
remain liable upon an extension that would otherwise release them. 33
The Code provisions dealing with automatic extension and extension
27. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (U.L.A.) §3-109, comment 4.
28. Britton, Formal Requisites of Negotiability- The Negotiable Instruments
Law Compared With the Proposed Commercial Code, 26 RocKY MT. L. REv. 1, 12
(1953-1954).
29. CODE §1-208.
30. Jacobs v. Automotive Repair Center, Inc., 137 So. 2d 263 (Ist D.C.A. Fla.

1962).
31. Siciliano v. Hunerberg, 135 So. 2d 750 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
32. CODE §§3-109 (1) (d), 3-118 (f).
33. See Fort Pierce Bank & Trust Co. v. Sewall, 113 Fla. 811, 152 So. 617 (1934).
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at the option of the maker are subject only to the limitation that the
extension must be to a further definite time. 34 The effect of the
Code provisions on Florida law could not be determined since no
cases dealing with extension have been found.
The sections of the Code dealing with time of payment are much
more comprehensive and explicit than the comparable sections of the
N.I.L., and answer most of the issues that have been litigated under
the N.I.L. For these reasons the Code is believed to represent a
desirable change in the law.
SUM CERTAIN PAYABLE IN MONEY

N.I.L.
3

N.I.L. section 1 (2): 5 [The instrument] must contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money ....
Code
Code section 3-104 (1) (d): [The writing must] contain an
unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in
money ....
Both the Code and the N.I.L. require that the promise or order
must be for a sum certain in money. The definitions of certainty in
the Code are largely a rewording of the corresponding N.I.L. provisions intended to clarify doubts that have arisen under the
N.I.L.36 The underlying criterion is that the amount can be calcu37
lated from the instrument itself without referral to an outside source.
The Code defines money as "a medium of exchange authorized or
adopted by a domestic or foreign government as a part of its currency," ' 38 and thereby resolves a conflict that exists under the N.I.L.
over what is meant by the term "money." 39 The instrument is payable in money if the specified medium complies with the definition of
"money" at the time the instrument is made.40 The Code provides
a presumption that an instrument payable in foreign currency is payable in the equivalent amount of dollars on the due date, but reserves
the right of the parties to make the instrument payable only in
34. CODE §3-109 (1) (d).
35. FLA. STAT. §674.02 (2) (1963).
36. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (U.L.A.) §3-106, Purposes of Changes.
37. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (U.L.A.) §3-106, comment 1.
38. CODE § 1-201 (24).
39. See Britton, Formal Requisites of Negotiability - The Negotiable Instruments Law Compared With the Proposed Commercial Code, 26 ROCKY MT. L. REV.
1, 19-20 (1953-1954).
40. CODE §3-107 (1).
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foreign currency.4 ' Thus, this provision settles another conflict that
exists under the N.I.L. when the instrument is made payable in a
foreign currency. 42 Although no modern Florida cases have been
found dealing with these problems, the Code promotes certainty by
a more comprehensive coverage of this area and settles questions that
have or may arise under the N.I.L. These changes tend to promote
commercial acceptability of negotiable paper and are desirable.
DESIGNATION OF PARTIES

N.I.L.
N.I.L. section 1 (4):43 [The instrument] must be payable to
order or to bearer ....
Code
Code section 3-104 (1) (d): [The writing must] be payable to
order or to bearer.
Both the Code and the N.I.L. require that an instrument must be
payable to order or to bearer. The N.I.L. enumerates instruments
payable to order in section 8,44 the Code in section 3-110. The Code
makes several changes in the N.I.L. by omitting section 10, which
allows use of language not in the act to designate order or bearer. 45
The Code provides in its stead that an instrument is payable to order
when it is payable to the order or assigns of any person specified
with reasonable certainty, or when it is designated on its face as "exchange" or the like and names a payee. 46 The Code provisions include
all of the definitions of the N.I.L., but change the language of some of
the N.I.L. sections for the sake of clarity. In addition, the Code adds
several provisions with an eye toward resolving conflicts and codifying
existing law to promote certainty. These sections include provisions
that an instrument may be payable to the order of an estate, trust,
fund, partnership, or unincorporated association, 47 and that instruments not otherwise payable to order are not made so by the words
"payable upon the return of this instrument properly indorsed."48

41. CODE §3-107 (2).
42. See Oliphant, The Theory of Money in the Law of Commercial Instruments, 29 YA.E L.J. 606, 620 (1920).
43. FLA. STAT. §674.02 (4) (1963).
44. FLA. STAT. §674.10 (1963).
45. FLA. STAT. §674.12 (1963).
46. CODE §3-110(1).
47- CODE §§3-110(1) (e), (g).
48. CODE §3-110(2).
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The Code also provides that an instrument payable to order and to
bearer is payable to order unless the bearer words are handwritten
or typewritten.

49

The basic provisions of the N.I.L. specifying when an instrument
is a bearer instrument are substantially followed by the Code. The
Code omits the section of the N.I.L. that makes an instrument payable
to bearer that is payable to the order of a fictitious or nonexisting
person, when such fact was known to the person making it so payable. 50 This situation is dealt with in section 3-405 of the Code, which
provides that such instruments are not bearer instruments, but remain
order instruments. Consequently, a regular chain of indorsements
would be required. 51 The Code still recognizes that instruments,
which do not purport to designate a specific payee, are bearer instruments;5 2 this provision, however, must be read with section 3-115 of
the Code where the situation is one in which there is simply no payee
designated in the instrument (Pay to the order of -------------------). In
such a case, the instrument is not a bearer instrument, but an incomplete order instrument and, to be effective, must be filled up in accordance with the authority given.53
An interesting application of the N.I.L. and Code provisions relating to instruments payable to a fictitious person is raised by the
fact situation in Florida National Bank at St. Petersburg v. Geer, decided by the Florida Supreme Court in 1957.5 4 The bank, drawee of a
check made payable to N. C. Baughman, cashed the check under an
indorsement by C. N. Baughman. When the drawer sued the bank to
recover the amount disbursed, the bank alleged the drawer did not
intend the payee to have a beneficial interest in the paper, but intended that the beneficial interest be in the actual indorser. The court
reversed a summary judgment for the drawer holding that proof
of the bank's allegation would bring the instrument under the fictitious person rule. 5, Under the Code the fictitious person rule would
not have made the check bearer paper, and a regular chain of indorsements would be a prerequisite to the bank escaping liability on
that issue. The court also held that the bank would have a defense
if it could prove the intended person had received the proceeds of
the check notwithstanding the indorsement. Such a holding would
not be changed by the Code.

49. CODE §3-110 (3).
50.

UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW §9 (3); FLA. STAT. §674.11 (3) (1963).

51.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

52.

CODE §3-111 (c).

53.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (U.L.A.) §3-111, comment

(U.L.A.) §3-405, comment 1.

2.

54. 96 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 1957).
55. Id. at 412.
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The Code makes one other notable change in the designation of
parties area by permitting a bill of exchange to be addressed to two
or more drawees alternatively 8 - a practice that is specifically prohibited by the N.I.L.57
The over-all treatment of designation of parties by the Code appears to be superior to the N.I.L. The Code, however, raises a potential trouble spot by drawing a fine distinction between instruments payable both to order and to bearer,58 and instruments payable
to bearer or the order of bearer,59 the former being classed as an order
instrument, and the latter being classed as a bearer instrument. Since
diverse results may be reached depending on the classification of the
instrument, such a difficult distinction may tend to produce litigation.
PERMISSIBLE CLAUSES

The N.I.L. sections6 ° that define the permitted clauses or omissions
that do not destroy negotiability may be grouped as those dealing
with:
(1) the date of the instrument;
(2) recitals of consideration;
(3) designation of the place drawn or payable;
(4) the disposition of collateral securities;
(5) confessions of judgment and waivers by the obligor;
(6) option of the holder to elect some performance in lieu of
payment in money.
The Code provisions61 dealing with the date of the instrument,
recitals of consideration, failure to designate the place drawn or
payable, and confessions of judgment or waivers by the obligor are
substantially identical with the N.I.L.
The Code provisions dealing with the disposition of collateral reflect a beneficial change. The N.I.L. allows a clause authorizing a
sale of collateral securities in the event the instrument is not paid at
maturity,0 2 which time may or may not coincide with time of default.
The Code, however, allows a clause authorizing such sale upon default 63 - a more realistic position when the default occurs before ma56.
57.
58.
59.

CODE §3-102 (1) (b).

60.

UNIFo m NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW

UNixoiu

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW §128; FLA. STAT. §676.01

(1963).

CODE §3-110 (3).
CODE §3-111 (a).
§§5,

6; FLA. STAT.

§§674.06-.07

(1963).

61. CODE §§3-112 (1)(a), (d), (e), 3-114 (1).
62.
63.

UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW §5 (1); FLA. STAT. §674.06 (1) (1963).

CODE §3-112 (1) (b).
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turity. In addition, the Code allows a clause containing a promise
to give additional collateral on demand, 64 a provision that has been
held in other jurisdictions to run afoul of the N.I.L. requirement
that the instrument not contain a promise to do an act in addition
65
to the payment of money.
The Code omits the N.I.L. section authorizing a clause that gives
the holder an election to require an act in lieu of payment of money. 66
The primary utility of this section is to give the benefits of negotiability to bonds that are convertible into stock. The separation of
bonds into a separate area of coverage by the Code, and the belief
that other instruments containing such a clause should not enjoy the
benefits of the Code are the reasons for this omission.7
The Code contains two additional provisions not included in the
N.I.L., one permitting a term in a draft that makes indorsement or
cashing of the draft by the payee an acknowledgment of full satisfaction of the drawer's obligation,68 and the other permitting a statement
in a draft drawn in parts to the effect that the order is effective only
if no other part has been honored.69 These provisions are included
in the Code to ensure that such clauses will not be construed to destroy negotiability and do not effect any substantial change in the
law.70

In addition to the permissible clauses previously discussed, both
the Code and the N.I.L. contain provisions that a seal does not effect
the negotiability of an instrument.71 The Code provision is designed
to remove an ambiguity over whether the law of sealed instruments
preempts the N.I.L. when the instrument is under seal. The provision
is intended to make it clear that a seal appearing on an instrument is
without significance when considering the substantive rights of the
parties thereunder.7 2 This represents no change of Florida law since
3
the same result has been reached under the Florida N.I.L.7

64. CODE §3-112 (1) (c).
65. See Britton, Formal Requisites of Negotiability- The Negotiable Instruments Law Compared With the Proposed Commercial Code, 26 ROCKY MT. L. REV.
1, 30 (1953-1954).
66.

UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW §5 (4); FLA. STAT. §674.06 (4) (1963).

67. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (U.L.A.)
new matter.
68.

§3-112, purposes of changes and

CODE §3-112 (1) (f).

69. CODE §3-112 (1) (g).
70. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
71.

CODE §3-113;

CODE (U.L.A.) §3-112, comments 4, 5.
UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW §6(4);

FLA. STAT.

§674.07 (4) (1963).
72. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (U.L.A.) §3-113, purposes of changes.
73. Cracowaner v. Carlton Nat'l Bank, 98 Fla. 792, 124 So. 275 (1929).
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Again the Code's treatment of the permissible clause area is
believed to be superior to the Florida N.I.L., thus enactment of the
Code provisions would be a beneficial change.
CONCLUSION

The Code's more comprehensive coverage of the formal requirements of negotiability is preferable to the N.I.L. as enacted in Florida.
Although there has not been a great deal of litigation under this
aspect of Florida N.I.L., the Code solves many potential areas of
litigation under existing law and would reduce the amount of litigation that is likely to occur without its enactment. Also, the Code
better serves the policy underlying creation of a special body of law
for negotiable instruments by appropriately limiting and expanding
its application to include only instruments of commercial significance.
Florida case law in this area will not be substantially changed by
enactment of the Code since Florida has followed the majority position on most questions, and with few exceptions this position has
been adopted by the Code. As a result, transition to the Code would
result in little change in existing law, and the benefits of the Code can
be reaped with little, if any, of the uncertainty usually attributable
to such a change.
CHARLE.S A. WLLiAmS, JR.
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